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Article
Introduction
This article is, at its deepest level, about the interaction 
between children and young people’s play and systems of 
management. At first sight, it might well appear that no inter-
action should be expected between such unlikely bed fellows 
as these, particularly as play has been characterized as behav-
ior that typically involves children directing their own 
actions, and engaging actively, flexibly, and adaptively with 
uncertain and unpredictable situations (Lester & Russell, 
2008) and thus, apparently, the antithesis of a managed activ-
ity. However, there is growing realization, from disparate 
walks of life ranging, for example, from outdoor adventure 
activities to education, health care, and even urban arboricul-
ture, that seemingly remote management systems can have 
subtle and unintended consequences on public life, which 
may detract from the achievement of socially desired goals 
(e.g., Ball & Ball-King, 2011, 2013; Graham & Wiener, 
1995). A reason for this may be that modern management 
systems continue at times to be overly reliant on methodolo-
gies derived from systems engineering.
It is undeniable that systems engineering approaches, 
as pioneered in the United States by Bell Laboratories, 
have been stunningly effective in dealing with immensely 
complex engineering problems of the type encountered, 
for example, in the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s 1960s Apollo program (Weigel, 2000). 
In that case, they enabled hundreds of agencies to work 
together on that intricate project and then to recombine their 
efforts into a working whole. However, systems engineering 
approaches have been less successful when applied to 
social issues. As Checkland and Poulter (2006, p. xi) have 
expressed,
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Abstract
The provision of stimulating and engaging play space for children and young people is increasingly recognized as an important 
societal goal, not the least because it provides the young with opportunities to develop and gain experience in experimenting 
with risk. Research in several disciplines now suggests that achievement of this goal has however been impeded in recent 
decades, and reasons commonly cited have included fear of injury and avoidance of litigation. International standards on play 
equipment have also been promulgated and justified in terms of securing young people’s “safety,” most usually narrowly 
defined as injury reduction. There appears to be a widespread presumption that measures aimed at injury prevention are 
necessarily beneficial overall for young people’s welfare. In this article, we subject European standards for play equipment 
and surfacing to scrutiny. In particular, we examine underlying motives, consistency of purpose, use of evidence, philosophical 
leanings, scope, practicalities of application, systems of management, and legal ramifications. From this, we identify a number 
of fundamental issues that suggest that as a consequence of compartmentalized thinking and misunderstandings, these 
standards have invaded areas of decision making beyond their legitimate territory. The consequence of this is that play 
provision is skewed away from what are properly play provision objectives. In such circumstances, local decision makers are 
often disempowered, and their ability to provide optimal play spaces thereby circumscribed.
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In the event, the pattern of activity found in Systems 
Engineering—namely, precisely define a need and then engineer 
a system to meet that need using various techniques—was 
simply not rich enough to deal with the buzzing complexity and 
confusion of management situations.
Similar issues, over the “richness” of management sys-
tems, have emerged yet more widely still, for example, in the 
finance sector over the risk management activity referred to 
as “internal control.” As Power (2004) has put it,
Internal control systems are also highly problematic. Not only is 
it difficult to define their effectiveness, but, more crucially, a 
growing obsession with internal control may itself be a source of 
risk. First, internal control systems are organizational projections 
of controllability which may be misplaced; such systems are 
only as good as the imaginations of those who designed them. 
Second, internal control systems are essentially inward-looking 
and may embody mistaken assumptions of what the public 
really wants reassurance about (p. 28).
In this article, we examine how a management system, 
whose primary interests are safety and free trade, has affected 
the provision of play spaces in ways that, we believe, also 
bear the hallmarks of the “richness” and “internal control” 
syndromes. Although, paradoxically, play is supposedly to 
be freely chosen, provision for play has in recent decades 
become highly managed with numerous actors having an 
involvement. These include equipment manufacturers, trade 
associations, designers, providers, procurers, standards set-
ters, insurers, inspectors, the courts (via litigation), policy 
makers, play workers, parents, and the young, each with their 
own agenda.
We are here particularly interested in the role of equip-
ment standards and in unintended consequences arising from 
them. Equipment standards are used by many of these actors 
for a variety of purposes, often without any questions being 
asked. Thus, standards may assume an overwhelming pres-
ence, essentially dictating what will eventuate. Our ability to 
address these issues is based on our collective immersion, 
over several decades, within the play sector. This includes 
participation in standards setting, equipment design and 
manufacture, play space design, play policy, litigation, and 
academic research.
Current Dilemmas of Play
There is an upsurge in the recognition of the value and impor-
tance of outdoor play for children and young people and on 
ways to give them better play opportunities (National 
Children’s Bureau, 2013). One reason for this is the realiza-
tion that, through play, humans gain some of their first expo-
sures to risk and this is where they learn how to cope with it 
at the personal level. As a 2012 high level statement from the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)—the United Kingdom’s 
safety regulator—has put it,
Play brings the world to life for children. It provides for an 
exploration and understanding of their abilities; helps them to 
learn and develop; and exposes them to the realities of the world 
in which they will live, which is a world not free from risk but 
rather one where risk is ever present. The opportunity for play 
develops a child’s risk awareness and prepares them for their 
future lives.
From our perspective, this new awareness was predictable 
and is welcome, for there are by now copious reports, 
research papers, and media statements warning that children 
and young people have in some societies been deprived of 
essential developmental experiences for several decades and 
that corrective action is urgently required (Bundy et al., 
2009; Guldberg, 2009; Jones, 2006; Louv, 2005; Play Safety 
Forum, 2002; Sandseter & Kennair, 2011). Multiple explana-
tions have been offered as to why the situation deteriorated 
as it did. These range over political, economic, legal, and 
social factors. In this article, we focus on the role and use of 
former British and now international playground safety stan-
dards, particularly European standards such as EN1176 and 
1177 promulgated by Comité Européen de Normalisation 
(CEN), the European Committee for Standardization (CEN, 
2008a, 2008b). These standards are very important for some 
of the actors involved in play provision, manufacturers obvi-
ously, but also other actors who may deploy them for reasons 
other than those for which they were designed, for example, 
avoidance of liability.
It has also been argued that in general standards of what-
ever kind may bring about undesirable changes in society 
(MacRae, 2011). As argued by MacRae, they may promote 
the economic interests of particular groups, may contribute 
to excessive rule observance and disproportionate regulatory 
activity, can lead to non-optimal resource allocation, and 
may even encroach on civil liberties. In partial recognition, 
perhaps, of these difficulties, recently promulgated interna-
tional standards even delve into the principles of risk man-
agement itself. Thus, the International Organization for 
Standardization’s publication ISO 31000 (2009) refers to the 
importance of context, risk attitudes, and the need to align 
culture with policy.
As noted, our emphasis here is on European standards. 
However, we are aware that similar research has been 
reported in North America on Canadian standards for play 
equipment (Herrington & Nicholls, 2007). Likewise, there is 
also concern more widely, from continental Europe to the 
Antipodes, about what has been described as a narrow focus 
by standards on one issue, physical injury, at the apparent 
expense of a host of other dangers that potentially come as a 
result of modifying or otherwise restricting active play 
(Bundy et al., 2009; Christensen & Mikkelsen, 2008). The 
tendency, both in the text of the standards and in playground 
inspection reports, to treat “safety” and “injury prevention” 
as self-evident correlates reinforces this narrowing of view. 
To put it simply, standards themselves ostensibly focus on 
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injury reduction and make scant reference to other issues of 
obvious importance, such as the health benefits of play and 
also opportunities to learn about risk. To deploy Checkland 
and Poulter’s (2006) terminology, they lack richness, or 
Power’s (2004) concept of internal control, they are too 
inward-looking and embody mistaken assumptions about 
what is needed.
In this article, we now discuss the ways in which these par-
ticular standards have been interpreted by various actors. Prior 
to doing this, it is necessary to examine a number of features 
and practical manifestations of how standards interact with the 
wider play community. This is achieved under the following 
headings: the evidence base that standards draw on, their 
ethos, their scope, and finally, their application during play 
inspections and as manifest in legal proceedings.
Examples of the Use of Scientific 
Evidence
Academic research ideally provides the evidence that under-
pins the design of interventions including those intended to 
increase safety. However, it is well-known that the commu-
nication and transfer of the meaning of research to end-users 
is a path with many potential pitfalls, even to the extent that 
“science communication” has become a topic of research in 
its own right. Thus, Herrington and Nicholls (2007) described 
how, in the 1970s and 1980s, lobbyists for Canadian play-
ground standards apparently failed to take account of 
Canadian studies that showed that injury levels on play-
grounds were not significantly high and misapplied injury 
data from the American Consumer Product Safety 
Commission. They speculated that this may have been done 
to fulfill primary objectives of the Canadian Standards 
Association (CSA; 2003), which were to “foster and promote 
voluntary standardization as a means of advancing the 
national economy” and to “facilitate domestic and interna-
tional trade.” Rational though of course these objectives are 
from a commercial perspective, they may not be synony-
mous with providing the best developmental opportunities 
for children and young people.
Some similarities with this situation, as described, can be 
observed in not-so-distant British play equipment standards. 
These earlier British standards are relevant because they 
went on to influence subsequent European standards. For 
example, British Standard BS 5696-2: 1979 and its 1986 ver-
sion both claim that only limited data were available on play-
ground accidents, thus requiring the standards Committee to 
“adopt a reasonable attitude in writing the recommendations 
for minimizing” the risks (British Standards Institution 
[BSI], 1979, 1986). Two points can be made about this. First, 
there were in fact statistics available by the early 1980s that, 
had the Committee looked, would have shown, as in Canada, 
that injury rates were low (these studies were identified in 
subsequent reviews; Ball, 1991; King & Ball, 1989). Second, 
the committee refers to “minimizing” risks. This is a particu-
lar view of injury control that is not universally shared. At 
the national level, risk minimization is not the normal goal 
and never has been, except in special circumstances. For 
example, the legal requirement in Britain is to do what is 
reasonable (or reasonably practicable) as set out in the Health 
and Safety at Work etc Act of 1974 (The National Archives, 
2013a) and the Occupiers’ Liability Acts of 1957 and 1984 
(The National Archives, 2013b, 2013c), and is a fundamental 
principle of risk management.1
These early British standards also contain other indicators 
of thought processes along with an apparently less than rig-
orous approach to evidence. For example, BS 7188: 1989, 
which was about the use of impact absorbing surfacing (IAS) 
in playgrounds, states in the Foreword that “Studies of acci-
dents have shown that the majority of the more serious cases 
involve head injuries caused through striking hard ground” 
(BSI, 1989). This bold statement is attributed in the standard 
to a 1975 article by Illingworth and colleagues, which had 
been published in the British Medical Journal (Illingworth, 
Brennan, Jay, Al-Rawi, & Collick, 1975). This is important 
because it was apparently on the strength of this evidence 
that BS 7188 went on to recommend the use of impact 
absorbing materials in playgrounds, a recommendation that 
subsequently had major implications for the design, specifi-
cation, and also cost of play provision.
However, careful scrutiny of the Illingworth article 
reveals some disconcerting facts. First, the article is about a 
sample of 200 injuries caused by playground accidents. Of 
these, just 49% occurred on a park or similar playground as 
opposed to a school playground or at home, suggesting that 
less than 100 cases were used to justify what eventually 
turned out to be a billion dollar activity of fitting park play-
grounds with impact absorbing surfaces. As the article itself 
states, “To draw meaningful conclusions about the relation 
of the severity of the accident to the type of play equipment 
greater numbers would be needed.” More disturbing still is 
that the article in no way supports the British Standards 
Committee’s then contention that “Studies of accidents have 
shown that the majority of the more serious cases involve 
head injuries caused through striking hard ground.” The arti-
cle in fact barely alludes to surfaces, and the majority of 
cases described were of minor injury. Of the few cases judged 
serious, 15 in total, most involved limb injuries and not the 
head, and IAS as then conceived were not designed to deal 
with limb injuries. Those cases, circa 6, which did involve 
the head, were attributed to a variety of causes including col-
lisions with persons or objects (such as swing seats or fixed 
equipment), collapsing equipment, childhood behavior, or 
were unassigned.
Subsequent to the recommendations of BS 7188 on IAS, 
further research has been reported seeking retrospective jus-
tification for these products as well as for the more rigorous 
imposition of standards. Some of this has been reviewed 
elsewhere up to 2002 (Ball, 2002), and more material has 
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been published since then by authors such as Norton, Nixon, 
and Sibert (2004) and Norton, Rolfe, et al. (2004). However, 
missing links persist in the chain from academic research on 
interventions aimed at fostering safety from injury, to their 
actual net benefit in the real world of children’s play. For 
example, has the massive expenditure on IAS passed the test 
of resources well used? What have been the subtle conse-
quences of placing children and young people in artificial 
environments when, arguably, they need to gain experience 
of the real world? What have been the consequences for the 
overall design of play environments? These basic questions 
continue to receive little more than superficial attention in 
much research on injury prevention.
Ethos and Perspective
Another fundamental issue regarding standards revolves 
around their ethos. In general terms, standards are primarily 
made for economic reasons. Despite, in some cases, setting 
safety requirements, they are the vehicles for ensuring free 
movement of goods between states. CEN’s own guide to the 
process states that, “European Standardization’s objective is 
to agree on common specifications to respond to the needs of 
industry, meet consumer expectations and contribute to the 
consolidation of the European Single Market” (CEN and 
CENELEC [European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization], 2010, 2012).
The technical committees that draft standards at a European 
level are made up of delegations from national standards bod-
ies that, by virtue of the above and the fact that delegates are 
self-financing, are industry dominated. In our experience, 
among their motivations are, first, removal of barriers to trade, 
and second, ensuring the resulting standard is as near as pos-
sible to each delegation’s national standard, thus avoiding the 
expense of changes for home manufacturers.
The process is essentially one of harmonization, and it 
would be a mistake to assume it necessarily addresses the 
specific issues that might be of relevance to a user. Its intent 
is more to bring dissimilar national standards together to iron 
out differences. In this way, harmonization is defined by 
CEN as, “prevention or elimination of differences in the 
technical content of (national) standards having the same 
scope, particularly those differences that may cause hin-
drances to trade” (CEN and CENELEC, 2010, 2012).
In terms of matters specific to the play equipment and 
surfacing standards, we draw attention to the fact that in 
the 1998 version of BS EN1176-1, it says in the section 
headed Scope that “It is not the purpose of this standard to 
encompass the play value.” Were this statement true, it 
would imply that the committee was concerned with risk 
minimization without reference to the benefits or “play 
value” of play provision. If so, this could well explain in 
some degree the emasculation of children and young peo-
ple’s play experiences over several decades. Intriguingly, 
this position has been adjusted in the Introduction to the 
latest version of BS EN1176-1 that opens with the state-
ment that “It is not the purpose of the requirements of this 
standard to lessen the contribution that playground equip-
ment makes to child development and/or play, which is 
meaningful from an educational point of view” (BSI, 
2008). It then goes on to state that “Play provision should 
aim at managing the balance between the need to offer 
risk and the need to keep children safe from serious harm.” 
Although this is radically different from the former 
position—which allegedly does not encompass play value 
or recognize the benefits of risk exposure—the standard 
itself has changed rather little in content. This is surpris-
ing with such an apparent shift in philosophy.
What is also missing is any acknowledgment of the source 
of this sea change. In fact, this is almost certainly attributable 
to the work of the United Kingdom’s Play Safety Forum 
(PSF), in particular its 2002 Position Statement which 
observed that there was growing concern about how safety 
was being addressed in play provision and that a focus on 
injury risk minimization had prevented children and young 
people from enjoying healthy play opportunities with poten-
tially damaging consequences for their development.
It could be argued, of course, that the PSF is just another 
interest group with different goals. However, the PSF’s 
membership—which takes in four national agencies involved 
in promoting play,2 a body involved in playwork training, a 
leading inclusive play provider, and several accident preven-
tion charities, as well as representatives from play equipment 
manufacturers and standard-setting bodies—arguably brings 
in a broader and more balanced set of perspectives than, for 
instance, the EN Standards Committee. Moreover, the PSF’s 
position is backed by substantial research, the volume of 
which increases year by year. Included in this would be a 
2002 review commissioned and published by the HSE (Ball, 
2002).
More recently, multiple authors from around the world 
have published on the benefits of play and the need for risk-
taking experiences by children and young people. In particu-
lar, there has been a sharp growth in research from a 
psycho-social perspective. This avenue of investigation con-
trasts with that of the engineering-cum-medical approach 
that appears to conform with the model followed by the 
Standards Committee. First, it takes on board behavioral fac-
tors in the causation of playground injuries. This is important 
because it remains the case that most playground accidents 
are behavior-related and hence difficult to solve through 
environmental (engineering) strategies alone (Ball, 2002). 
Second, these approaches open the door to the overt consid-
eration of the benefits of play and of risk taking, something 
frequently lacking in the engineering-cum-medical way of 
thinking which is more narrowly focused on injury 
reduction.
In particular, a suite of articles by Morrongiello and col-
leagues explores the psychology of childhood risk taking. 
One motivation for this inquiry is,
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Many injury-prevention specialists believe that playground 
safety can best be realized by advocating for changes in 
environmental design and product safety standards. The 
simplicity of this approach is appealing. However, to the extent 
that children’s behaviours also create risk, environmental 
modifications to playgrounds are not likely to be sufficient to 
prevent injury. (Morrongiello & Matheis, 2007, p. 827)
And another is,
. . . use of safety gear may result in mis-perceptions of injury risk 
and this can produce unwanted effects. Specifically, individuals 
may assume that safety gear completely protects against all 
injury, and therefore the need to be cautious no longer exists, 
resulting in greater risk taking or increased tolerance for risk 
taking. (Morrongiello, Walpole, & Lassenby, 2007, p. 619)
This phenomenon, commonly referred to as risk compen-
sation, has been a bone of contention for decades within pub-
lic safety in general. This is not because of any lack of 
evidence for its existence—it can be seen in many pursuits, 
from cycling (Adams & Hillman, 2001) to mountaineering 
(Tejada-Flores, 1967). It is a controversial idea perhaps 
because it poses difficult questions for those who are com-
mitted to pursuing risk reduction by environmental means. 
However, it could still have been argued that risk compensa-
tion was an adult phenomenon and that it did not apply to 
children, but not anymore. Morrongiello, Walpole, and 
Lasenby (2007) have provided clear evidence that children 
(7-12 years of age) do increase their propensity to take risks 
when in situations that appear safer. Furthermore, this behav-
ior arises because children see themselves as invulnerable 
from serious injury in apparently protective settings 
(Morrongiello, Lassenby, & Walpole, 2007), and because 
parents themselves become more relaxed about childhood 
risk taking (Morrongiello & Major, 2002). There is in fact a 
long history of such adult behavior with regard to children in 
their care in wider social settings (Viscusi, 1992). From this, 
it would appear that harboring the belief that safety can be 
achieved by environmental modifications alone is a false 
philosophy.
Christensen and Mikkelsen (2008, p. 113), writing about 
risk in play from a sociological perspective, further rein-
forced doubts about the wholesale application of the envi-
ronmental approach to reducing risk. Like Morrongiello, 
they believe that the application of risk management as a 
“professional-technical function” is problematic in the con-
text of everyday public life. They also go beyond this to chal-
lenge the concept of risk elimination, quoting Malaby (2002):
Any view that begins with the assumption that risk is dangerous 
(and should be minimized/avoided) must be questioned . . . it is 
through the engagement of indeterminacies, rather than their 
minimization or resolution . . . that one may socially demonstrate 
one’s place vis-à-vis chance, and, by extension, one’s place in 
relation to others in the world.
Why, in the case of children and young people, might this 
be pertinent? As Christensen and Mikkelsen (2008, p. 113) 
said, again drawing on Malaby (2002), it can be posited that 
everyday life is characterized by uncertainty (risk), of which 
one may discern three basic kinds:
•• performance indeterminacy, that is, in attempting to 
do something you may fail
•• social indeterminacy, that is, interacting with others 
may lead to misunderstanding
•• cosmological indeterminacy, that is, dealing with 
unanticipated events
These are uncertainties that children experience every day 
through immersion in the world. Being in this world enables 
them to learn how to deal with uncertainty and is in fact the 
only practical way in which they can learn many coping 
mechanisms. Consequently, attempting to engineer a risk-
free world pushes children (and parents) into a Disneyesque 
situation in which uncertainty is supposed not to occur. Not 
only is this a deception, for none of the measures is totally 
protective, but as Greening et al. say, it results in children 
having a lack of experience and being desensitized to poten-
tial health risks (Greening, Stoppelbein, Chandler, & Elkin, 
2005).
There is a long-standing view that children need to 
encounter risks to develop and participate actively in society 
(Roberts, Smith, & Bryce, 1995). Indeed, children are by no 
means careless risk takers but engage with risks deliberately, 
at least some of the time, as a means of exploring and under-
standing themselves and the world. Christensen and 
Mikkelsen’s (2008) research shows that they are in fact prac-
ticing their own sophisticated form of risk management, an 
activity that is frequently invisible to adults. To attempt to 
isolate young people from such opportunities excludes them 
from many social relationships, emotional excitement, and 
involvement with other children. Furthermore, accidents are 
important events for children from which they learn many 
things. Thus, it can be argued that adults would be well-
advised not to pursue the fallacy of risk elimination but 
instead create environments that will engage and extend chil-
dren’s risk assessment (RA) and management skills in a way 
that they will understand the nature of the world and so 
enhance their resilience (Gill, 2007, 2010).
Thus, the movement to reduce the injury toll on children’s 
playgrounds may have been detrimental overall, in that it has 
deprived children of life experiences (fun and sorrow) and 
challenge (Herrington & Nicholls, 2007), subverted the 
evolutionary process of learning from one’s mistakes 
(Christensen & Mikkelsen, 2008), may have led to an 
increase in psychopathology and neuroticism (Sandseter & 
Kennair, 2011), and has cast aside opportunities to foster citi-
zenship and community (Peterson, 2011). It has also diverted 
a large percentage of the play budget away from its primary 
goals without clear evidence of net benefit (Ball, 2004).
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Scope
The arguments above lead us to question the scope of stan-
dards as currently conceived. Standards are often presented 
as being technical documents whose content and coverage 
are matters of objective truth and science. We reject this 
view, arguing instead that they are saturated with value judg-
ments, a position reminiscent of that described by Collins 
(2009) in his analysis of the contemporary debate over the 
standing of scientific knowledge, and by Seedhouse (1997) 
in his discussion of the political bases of health care. 
Furthermore, it is the failure to recognize this paradox that 
leads to many of the confusions around standards and their 
application.
We think that the metaphor of “territory” is a useful way of 
characterizing the sort of issues that need to be addressed. 
Currently, we argue, play equipment standards occupy too 
large a territory. They trespass on, or colonize, areas where 
they have no right to be. There are arguments to be had as to 
where precisely the line of the new border between technical 
facts and value-based judgments should be drawn. However, 
before that discussion can take place, there first needs to be an 
acceptance of our premise: that is, that the territory currently 
occupied by play equipment standards is too extensive.
To be clear, our position is not that playground equipment 
standards are unnecessary, but that they have been allowed to 
influence areas beyond the scope of their competence. We 
draw a distinction between aspects of playground equipment 
standards that legitimately fall within the scope of engineer-
ing-cum-medical expertise and those that do not. That latter 
region, where engineering-cum-medical expertise should 
hold no sway, is the area where the emphasis should be on 
locally based value judgments. It lies squarely in the “rich-
ness” domain of Checkland and Poulter (2006).
Examples of where the standards should rightly hold sway 
include requirements for the structural integrity of play equip-
ment platforms; specifying how deep the foundations should 
be for individual pieces of equipment; determining the appro-
priate length and strength of an unsupported cross beam. These 
are areas where the objective facts of the matter have legiti-
mate authority. This is quite distinct from the wider, more 
complex, nuanced, and value-saturated considerations that 
need to be taken into account when determining what, in any 
particular case, constitutes “an acceptable level of risk.”
We recognize that there are some gray areas where it is 
open to argument as to which side of our proposed border a 
particular aspect of play provision lies. One example might 
be in the matter of fall heights and undersurfacing. Should 
there be a standard, and if so, should it be in its present form, 
and how can the associated subjectivities and value judg-
ments of any such standard be recognized? We do not here 
answer this question, but we recognize that it is a legitimate 
and important one to ask.
Currently, standards and the process of standard-making 
make no distinction between objective, engineering- 
cum-medical considerations, and value-based judgments. 
Instead, the two distinct territories are treated as one unified 
field of knowledge and decision making. This has had a 
deadening effect on the decision-making capacity of play 
providers, undermining their confidence and capacity to 
make informed value-based judgments about what is good 
for children and young people. Play providers have in effect 
ceded their authority to make value-based decisions to forms 
of technical expertise that should remain silent in the 
matter.
Judgments about what constitutes an “acceptable level of 
risk” in any particular situation do not admit of one objective 
and certain answer. Answers will emerge from the interplay 
between individual, community, and societal values, under-
standings, and beliefs. The sort of considerations that come 
into play here include views about children and young peo-
ple’s competence; the potential utility or otherwise of experi-
encing some injuries; the benefits, or otherwise, of risk 
taking. More prosaic local factors such as the age range and 
interests of users, and the degree, style, and intensity of adult 
supervision or oversight may also be relevant. The judg-
ments made here are mediated through, and find life in, accu-
mulated practical experience, which is the only way of 
dealing with “the buzzing complexity and confusion” of 
such management situations (Checkland & Poulter, 2006).
This value-saturated, accumulated practical experience 
might be one useful, although by no means comprehensive, 
way of characterizing “common sense.” It is experience-
based knowledge that is drawn from, feeds into, and is tested 
in everyday life. Two aspects of this knowledge base have 
particular salience. One is our capacity to observe what chil-
dren and young people actually do and how they judge, 
negotiate, and respond to the different situations that they 
find or put themselves in. The other aspect is that every adult 
has, by definition, intimate, personal experience of being a 
child and knows—from the inside—something about the 
capabilities, interests, likes, and dislikes of children and 
young people. In other words, the types of knowledge high-
lighted here encompass what we might call a “lived-in” 
behavioral, psycho-social perspective.
“Common sense” judgments are not unassailable; they are 
open to challenge, and one person’s common sense is often not 
the same as another’s. This poses no in-principle problem. 
Attitudes to children, young people, their play, indeed to wider 
questions about the meaning and status of childhood and ado-
lescence, are proper subjects of debate and contention within 
society. What counts here is that these types of question matter 
sufficiently to be the focus of our attention. At base, this is the 
stuff of politics and ethics, outside the purview of engineering-
cum-medical stipulations and certainly beyond the scope of 
any standard. The sort of knowledge outlined here is simply 
ill-disposed to standardization.
Play Equipment Inspections
Problems with the structure and content of standards are mir-
rored in the custom and practice associated with play 
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equipment inspections that, nowadays, constitute a major 
function in the provision of play. Playground inspections, as 
currently undertaken, are typically inspections in relation to 
standards. This is made clear in the following two edited and 
typical extracts from two anonymized play inspection com-
panies’ reports:
Reference is made in this report to the European standard which 
is the appropriate safety standard for the site and equipment. The 
requirements and recommendations set out in that standard are 
not mandatory but provide the best information upon which risk 
assessments should be based.
The inspections are carried out to assess the ongoing safety, 
stability and operation following the relevant European (EN) or 
British (BS) Standard . . . All inspections are non-dismantling 
and do not include testing that requires specialist equipment e.g. 
structural and impact attenuation testing or the use of a ladder 
. . . A professional 5x5 risk assessment focusing on items of 
equipment is provided . . . to assist the operator in determining 
the level of hazard found.
The references to standards, non-dismantling of equip-
ment, RA, hazards, and safety are made in most inspection 
reports we have seen.
As we indicated earlier, when discussing the scope of 
standards, there are some issues covered by standards that 
are entirely legitimate and fall within the purview of what we 
have characterized as engineering-cum-medical territory. 
These include things such as the strength and structural 
integrity of crossbars and foundations, and the sag of cable-
ways. Paradoxically, these areas of legitimacy, undeniably 
important from a safety perspective, are rarely addressed in 
playground inspections, because the requisite test equipment 
is expensive, require the presence of more than one inspec-
tor, or are beyond the competence of an inspector to assess. 
Given that inspections are in the main “non-dismantling,” as 
the above extract makes clear, the inspection’s claim that 
they “assess the ongoing safety, stability and operation . . . ” 
of equipment is open to question. Related to this, there are 
parallel questions to be asked as to the degree of utility of 
post-installation or annual inspections provide, given that 
key elements of the equipment are left unchecked.
If the current standard encompasses stipulations beyond its 
competence, then any inspection that is based on the standard 
is likely to replicate the error. This has been experienced by 
those attempting to create more natural play environments, 
whether in designated play areas or as “playable space.” Here, 
we find that boulders and fallen trees, for example, often 
become subject to inspection against the letter of the play 
equipment standards, with no room for judgment as to their 
relevance or applicability in more naturalistic contexts. In one 
example, play inspectors considering a raised log trail through 
mature woodland specified that the ground cover around the 
logs should be kept free from all loose materials and debris. 
Yet the “natural” world, even when contrived by the human 
hand, is essentially knobbly and irregular and not susceptible 
to standardization. Adherence to equipment-based inspection 
leads to inspection regimes effectively scuppering play pro-
viders’ service objectives so far as creating more natural play 
settings is concerned.
Another problem is that inspections can obscure the dif-
ference between RA judgments and compliance or non- 
compliance with equipment or surfacing standards. It is not 
unusual to find inspections that “fail” equipment or surfaces 
for what common sense would judge are but minor devia-
tions from the standard.
The wider question to be addressed here is as follows: 
What is the relationship between equipment standards and 
RA and management? Does a deviation from the standard 
automatically move the deviant equipment or surface toward 
creating an unacceptable level of risk? The answer is that it 
does not. And the reason for this is that there is no necessary 
relationship between equipment and surface standards, and 
judgments about what might constitute an acceptable level of 
risk. By way of example, it does not automatically follow 
that a fall height of more than 1 m with no IAS represents in 
practice a heightened level of risk, still less that it could be 
deemed to constitute an unacceptable level of risk. Standards 
are not a proxy for RA or management. This is in fact 
accepted by the standard itself, if only implicitly, although 
seemingly not always by inspectors, in that allowance is 
made within the standard for variation in interpretation in 
different jurisdictions.
Underlying this is the fundamental, in principle, problem 
of play equipment inspectors undertaking risk (benefit) 
assessments (RBAs)3 at all. RBA, by its very nature, is a 
holistic process, each assessment focusing on the particulari-
ties of each individual site and its context. This includes, on 
one hand, the duty holder’s play policy and provision objec-
tives; and on the other, knowledge of each particular provi-
sion, how it is used in practice, how that use may or may not 
change over time and by different segments of the user popu-
lation. Hence, monitoring of the provision yields some of the 
information required to make an informed risk-benefit judg-
ment (Department for Children, Families and Schools, 2008; 
National Children’s Bureau, 2013).
Play equipment inspectors, then, whose formal qualifica-
tion may be restricted to knowledge of the equipment stan-
dards, are not in a position to make risk-benefit judgments on 
behalf of the duty holder, for three key reasons:
•• standards cannot stand proxy for judgments about 
what constitute acceptable levels of risk. One cannot 
“read-off” a risk rating simply by referring to compli-
ance or non-compliance with a standard;
•• RBAs are value saturated, and those values must be 
those of the duty holder’s, not the inspectors. In addi-
tion, the information required to form judgments 
about what constitutes an acceptable level of risk 
includes actual knowledge of how the provision is 
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used over time—a “snapshot,” one-off visit, often at a 
time when no children are using the provision, forms 
no basis for informed judgment;
•• in law, making the risk (benefit) judgment is the 
responsibility of the duty holder; it cannot usually be 
outposted to external inspectors. Thus, any advice 
given to the duty holder, once accepted, typically 
becomes the duty holder’s responsibility.
It needs to be stressed that in many countries, play equip-
ment inspections, as with the standards themselves, are not 
mandatory. Conducting an RA or RBA is a legal requirement 
(in the United Kingdom at least). As with standards, so too 
with inspections, play providers have ceded their responsi-
bility to determine whether in any particular case an external 
inspection is required and, if so, the criteria by which play 
provision is assessed.
Play Standards and the Courts
Turning now to the actual status of a European standard, 
once agreed (and this is by consensus in the Technical 
Committee and eventually by weighted voting of member 
states), it has to be implemented as a national standard in all 
31 of the CEN’s member states. In the United Kingdom, 
standards remain voluntary but are often cited in legal pro-
ceedings, thus giving them what appears to be and is conve-
niently assumed to be, a legal status. In European general 
safety legislation (European Parliament, 2002), however, it 
is perfectly acceptable to produce goods independently certi-
fied as safe but without compliance to the EN. Even so, it is 
important to remain aware that compliance with the standard 
does not of itself confer immunity from legal obligations, as 
BS EN 1176 itself states (BSI, 2008).
Nonetheless, recent history has found playground acci-
dents to be an area of keen public interest in the United 
Kingdom, one that has on occasion led to legal proceedings. 
Doubtless, there are numerous reasons for this, one being the 
existence of the false belief that playgrounds can and should 
be totally safe, such that any accident is an automatic sign of 
someone’s culpability. In addition, however, standards them-
selves have become entrained in this legal interest because 
they can be interpreted as providing a simple and easily 
applied recipe for determining whether a play space was of 
an officially approved quality and “safe.” This tendency has 
been noted in particular in courts of the first instance (lower 
courts) that place heavy reliance on compliance with pub-
lished standards and advice (Ball, Maggs, & Barrett, 2009). 
In contrast, appeal courts have shown themselves to be far 
more concerned with basic principles and the intent of the 
originating lawmakers, for example, whether what was done 
was reasonable in the circumstances. However, taking a case 
to an appeal court is a daunting proposition for anyone.
The problem for play providers, and society, is that the 
provision of good play opportunities may be supplanted by 
an interest in minimizing the risk of legal penalties, thereby 
restricting the provider’s scope for decision making, a phe-
nomenon that has, as we noted earlier, been termed “second-
ary risk management” (Power, 2004). There appear to be 
three substantive issues. The first is that standards are over-
interpreted and focus on one form of harm, physical injury 
compounded with the fact that for the most part, they are 
based on questionable assumptions as to what might consti-
tute a reasonable level of safety. Second, they cannot cater 
for local circumstances that, for whatever reason, might 
demand a more or less risky option. And third, the extent to 
which they factor in the benefits of play is obscure.
Conclusion
The rightness of the proposition that play involves self-
directed, flexible responses to uncertainty (Lester & Russell, 
2008) is now being substantiated by a growing body of 
research in social science. The rightness of it is attributable 
to the developmental needs of the young, and the net payoffs 
for society of the young going through that process and—it 
is important to remember—young people’s enjoyment of 
their childhood in the here and now. The paradox is that we 
live in an era of management systems, many of which come 
with elements derived from systems engineering approaches, 
and which are less adept at supporting that highly variable, 
complex, and unpredictable form of personal and social 
expression, play.
This article examines issues that have troubled play 
providers for some decades, in particular, the diversion of 
play away from what play experts regard as its true goals. 
No doubt there are a number of reasons for this having 
happened, but in this article, our focus has been the 
impacts of European standards, including former British 
standards, on the safety of play equipment on play provi-
sion and the iron hand that this has placed on provision 
through the complex management system that has grown 
up around it.
The outcome is a picture of play equipment standards as 
facing a range of challenges. We examined their evidence 
base, ethos, scope, and application, and found problems in 
each area. Our critique has ranged across a number of disci-
plines, including science, management, philosophy, psychol-
ogy, public policy, law, and practical experience in use. 
Although we have focused on European standards, we 
believe that our analysis may well apply to standards from 
other parts of the world as reported, for example, by 
Herrington and Nicholls (2007).
Our aim is not to question the actions of individuals or 
institutions who are often well-meaning. It is to suggest how 
management systems, processes, and ways of thinking have 
led to a situation whereby a tool that apparently aims to 
reduce the levels of injury and suffering experienced by chil-
dren and young people has inadvertently created significant 
barriers to their health and well-being. As noted in the 
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Introduction, unintentional “risk transfer” problems of this 
kind are not new and have been identified in many walks of 
life (e.g., Graham & Wiener, 1995).
As should be clear, we take seriously the goal of giving 
children the opportunity for healthy, enjoyable, and develop-
mentally stimulating play experiences. Moreover, we wel-
come the greater attention and effort being given to children 
and young people’s outdoor play in many countries around 
the world.
What can be done about this situation? The normal 
response to calls for research on children’s play is for further 
investigation of measures to reduce risk, for example, there 
is an ongoing debate on the need for improved safety surfac-
ing. However, we think that research of a different kind is 
needed that would focus on
•• measuring the benefits of play provision;
•• understanding more about how children and young 
people learn about risk;
•• reexamining and debating how standards can best 
contribute to this process;
•• identifying the historical, cultural, and economic fac-
tors leading to the pre-eminence of technical stan-
dards when dealing with complex social and personal 
phenomena;
•• the use of evidence in the revision of standards;
•• and “common sense,” non-formal forms of decision 
making.
Notes
1. Although it is sometimes argued by those intent on risk mini-
mization that the legal requirement should be seen as a mini-
mum standard, this is illogical because it would imply that 
one should do more than is reasonable, itself an unreasonable 
proposition.
2. The four agencies are Play England, PlayBoard Northern 
Ireland, Play Scotland, and Play Wales.
3. We prefer the term risk benefit assessment (RBA) over risk 
assessment (RA). RBA explicitly acknowledges the benefits 
of play, including exposure to some risk, whereas the term risk 
assessment does not. However, the comments in the text apply 
equally to RBA and RA.
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